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Previous literature holds that tactical voting inhibits the 
development of third parties in first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
systems. Third-party supporters are expected to vote tacti-
cally for a less-preferred party with a better chance of 
winning to avoid casting wasted votes and seeing their 
least-preferred party win. Despite this, however, a grow-
ing body of research notes that party system fragmenta-
tion often exceeds the two-party predictions associated 
with “Duverger’s Law” (see Singer, 2013 and the works 
cited therein).
Cox (1997: 76–79) provides four sets of explanations for 
why voters may not vote tactically. One is that voters are 
focused on the long-term rather than the short-term conse-
quences of their actions. A second is that voters hold their 
first preferences too intensely and/or are indifferent towards 
second/lower preferences to vote tactically (e.g. Blais, 
2002). A third holds that voters believe one party will win 
with certainty (in which case there is no reason to vote tacti-
cally). A fourth holds that voters’ perceptions of the parties’ 
chances of winning their district prevent them from voting 
tactically because they fail to recognize their preferred party 
is likely to place third or worse. Most recent research seek-
ing to explain support for third parties in FPTP systems 
focuses on this fourth explanation, concluding that voters 
often fail to recognize when their most-preferred party is out 
of the running, and thus do not vote tactically (Blais, 2002; 
Blais and Turgeon, 2004; Clough, 2007).
While many voters may not recognize which parties are 
out of the running in their districts, the fact many parties 
routinely place third or worse in election after election 
makes it hard to believe that third-party voters consistently 
misperceive these parties’ chances. This is especially the 
case for third parties that rarely win seats, whose supporters 
should recognize they have little chance of winning. If 
these and other voters supporting third-placed parties cast 
their votes knowing these parties will not likely win, this 
would call into question whether third-placed voting is due 
to the failure of one of the other assumptions required for 
tactical voting to limit the number of parties to two.
In this research note, I examine violations of the fourth 
assumption required for tactical voting to occur (i.e. whether 
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voters supporting a party placing third in their district fail to 
recognize that this party is out of the running) using the case 
of Canada. Despite using FPTP rules, Canada has a multi-
party system not only at the national level, but also at the 
district level, where multiparty fragmentation is the norm 
(Johnston and Cutler, 2009). Canadian elections have, his-
torically, centered on the only two parties to have controlled 
government: the centrist Liberals and the center-right 
Conservatives. Since 1961, the center-left, social demo-
cratic New Democratic Party (NDP) has also contested most 
districts despite failing to win many seats—often placing 
third or worse behind the Liberals and Conservatives (with 
the exception of 2011, in which the NDP’s vote share sur-
passed the Liberals’ for the first time). More recently, the 
Green Party has begun contesting most districts across the 
country. While the NDP and Greens occasionally finish first 
or second in some districts, the fact significant numbers of 
voters continue to support these parties in spite of their 
third-place status in most districts requires explanation. If 
voters supporting parties placing third (or worse) in their 
districts do so knowing that these parties are likely to finish 
third, this would suggest that the impact of voters’ percep-
tions of viability on third-party voting is more limited than 
previously thought—and that research examining violations 
of the other assumptions required for tactical voting to occur 
is needed to understand why third parties often win non-
trivial vote shares in FPTP systems.
Data analysis
To determine whether Canadian voters supporting parties 
finishing third or worse in their districts recognize that 
these parties are out of the running, I analyze voter per-
ceptions in districts where the party they voted for placed 
third or worse, focusing only on respondents facing the 
choice of voting tactically or not (Alvarez et al., 2006).1 
To this end, I use data from the 2006, 2008, and 2011 
Canadian Election Studies. The pre-election waves of 
these surveys contained questions tapping voters’ percep-
tions of electoral viability validated by previous research 
as accurate measures of respondents’ assessments (Blais 
et al., 2008). Specifically, respondents were first asked 
which party had the best chance of winning their district, 
and then asked whether they thought a second party had 
a chance of winning. Using these questions, I created 
variables identifying respondents who correctly per-
ceived that the party they voted for was likely to place 
third or worse—and thus was out of the running—in their 
districts (relative to those who did not). To rule out the 
possibility that third-party voting was due to voters per-
ceiving that only one party had a chance of winning, I 
restrict the analysis to respondents perceiving that at least 
two parties had a chance of winning their district.
Table 1 presents the percentages of third-party voters 
correctly perceiving that the party they voted for was out 
of the running. Clear majorities of both NDP and Green 
Party voters recognize that these parties have little chance 
of winning their districts. While a lack of accurate infor-
mation about the parties’ chances may explain why some 
voters support parties placing third or worse in their dis-
tricts, a lack of information cannot explain why clear 
majorities of these parties’ voters do so. If anyone has 
inaccurate perceptions of the parties’ chances of winning 
the district, it is those voting for the Conservatives and 
Liberals. Though the percentages of voters perceiving 
each party as out of the running in the district are consid-
erably smaller than the shares of NDP and Green Party 
voters, the fact remains that non-trivial shares of Liberal 
and Conservative voters in districts where each party fin-
ished third or worse voted for the party despite knowing 
it was out of the running.
Before concluding that many third-party voters accu-
rately perceived the party they supported as out of the run-
ning, we must account for several alternative explanations 
of voters’ perceptions of parties’ viability. To this end, I 
merged data from all three elections and estimated a series 
of logistic regression models predicting whether voters 
correctly perceived each party as non-viable in districts 
where the party finished third or worse. I expand the sam-
ples used in Table 1 to include those not voting for the 
party placing third. This allows us to compare the percep-
tions of voters supporting parties finishing third or worse 
with the perceptions of other parties’ voters. If third parties 
succeed in winning votes due to voter misperceptions 
about their viability, we would expect voters supporting 
third-placed parties would be considerably less able to per-
ceive them as non-viable than voters supporting one of the 
top two parties in the district.2
To rule out potential partisan-motivated reasoning—
like “wishful thinking,” when voters over/underestimate a 
party’s chances because they like/dislike the party—I 
Table 1. Correct perceptions of party viability among third-
party voters in districts where the party placed third or worse, 
by party voted for.
Party voted for Year
2006 2008 2011
Liberal 42% 28% 39%
(59) (53) (106)
Conservative 38% 52% 44%
(68) (29) (14)
New Democratic Party 63% 65% 77%
(199) (105) (102)
Green 94% 89% 94%
(86) (92) (51)
Entries are the sample-weighted percentages of third-party voters in 
districts outside Québec where their parties placed third or worse 
perceiving that the party they voted for was out of the running (with the 
weighted number of observations in parentheses).
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included feeling thermometers for each party. I also 
included variables to rule out the possibility that voters 
may be less able to perceive when parties are non-viable in 
more competitive districts, defined separately as the com-
petition between first- and second-placed parties in the dis-
trict, and the competition between each party and the party 
placing second. Finally, dummy variables are included to 
account for election-specific differences in the probabili-
ties of voting for each party.
Parameter estimates appear in Table 2. The results 
show that Liberal and Conservative voters were no less 
likely to perceive these parties as being out of the running 
in their districts than other parties’ voters. Even when we 
assume preference orderings with the minimum possible 
differences in thermometer scores between the parties to 
minimize the impact of these variables on perceptions of 
viability—using the mean scores assigned to the parties 
by each party’s voters to arrange parties in order of pref-
erence3—and hold the second/third-party competitive-
ness score to 0.5 (assuming a third-party’s vote share is 
half as large as the second-place party),4 the bottom of 
Table 2 shows that a majority of all four parties’ voters 
possessed accurate perceptions. While NDP and Green 
Party voters were significantly less likely to perceive 
these parties as out of the running than other parties’ vot-
ers, the percentages of NDP/Green voters correctly per-
ceiving each party to be out of the running exceeded 
those of Liberal and Conservative voters.
Table 2. Logistic regression estimates of voters’ perceptions of whether parties are out of the running.
Predictors Party placing third
Liberal Conservative NDP Green
Voted for the Party −0.18 −0.34 −0.63** −0.96*
(1=Yes, 0=No) (0.24) (0.45) (0.23) (0.37)
Liberal Thermometer −2.18** −0.49 0.64 1.33*
 (0.35) (0.75) (0.35) (0.57)
Conservative Thermometer 0.49 −2.21** 0.69* 0.19
 (0.25) (0.60) (0.30) (0.51)
NDP Thermometer 0.77* 0.09 −1.15* 1.22*
 (0.34) (0.67) (0.41) (0.62)
Green Thermometer 0.59 0.05 0.57 −2.67**
 (0.30) (0.62) (0.33) (0.53)
First-Second Competitiveness 0.51 −1.58 0.52 3.10*
 (0.58) (1.22) (0.66) (1.18)
Second-Third Competitiveness −2.19** −1.96* −1.81** −4.30**
 (0.31) (0.87) (0.45) (0.71)
2008 −0.41 1.30** 0.33 0.72
 (0.23) (0.37) (0.18) (0.37)
2011 −0.56* 0.44 1.11** 1.12**
 (0.23) (0.37) (0.22) (0.36)
Constant 1.84** 2.96** 1.85** 3.75**
 (0.36) (0.86) (0.37) (0.47)
McFadden’s R2 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.14
n 1171 309 1629 3047
% Correctly identifying party as out of the running 
 Liberal Conservative NDP Green
Third-party voters 60% 54% 67% 72%
Other-party voters 64% 62% 79% 87%
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.005, two-tailed tests. Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
Notes:
Data exclude respondents from Québec.
Dependent variable measured 1 if respondents correctly perceived the party as out of the running to finish first or second, and 0 otherwise.
Each “thermometer” variable is measured from 0 to 1 (cold to warm feelings).
“First-Second Competitiveness” measures the district-level proportion of the vote won by the first-placed party in the district minus the district-
level proportion for the second-placed party in the district; higher values reflect less competitive elections.
“Second-Third Competitiveness” measures competitiveness between second-placed parties and parties placing third or worse by dividing the 
district-level vote percentage for the party in each column by the district-level vote percentage for the second-placed party in the district; higher 
values represent more competitive races between the listed party and the second-placed party in the district.
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In keeping with previous research (Blais, 2002; Blais 
and Turgeon, 2004), the results also show that voters 
were particularly less/more likely to perceive a party as 
out of the running if they held strong preferences for/
against parties. As seen in Figure 1, the results also sug-
gest closer contests between each third-or-worse-placed 
party and the second-placed party in the district decreased 
the probability that respondents correctly perceived a 
party as being non-viable. That said, Figure 1 also shows 
that it is only in close races where a majority of third-
party voters failed to recognize when a party was out of 
the running. Thus, sizable shares of each party’s voters 
cast their votes despite knowing the party had little 
chance of winning their district.
Conclusion
The analysis above suggests a significant share of third-
party voters in Canada recognize these parties had little 
chance of winning. This stands in contrast to previous 
research emphasizing the importance of (in)accurate infor-
mation for explaining why so many voters in FPTP systems 
support third-placed parties. Though inaccurate information 
explains some of the non-tactical behavior observed in 
FPTP systems, the findings above suggest much of this 
behavior remains to be explained. As a result, more research 
focusing on the other assumptions required for tactical vot-
ing—that voters are short-term instrumentally rational and 
not too strongly attached to their parties to vote tactically 
(see Cox, 1997: 76–79)—is needed. As part of this effort, 
future research examining non-tactical behavior in other 
countries is needed to demonstrate the generalizability of 
the findings. While Canadian third parties have long 
attracted considerable support, the fact significant third par-
ties have persisted in other FPTP systems (namely, the 
United Kingdom, and New Zealand prior to 1993) suggests 
the lessons learned here may be generalizable.
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of correctly perceiving parties placing third or worse among respondents voting for the party.
Notes: Entries are the predicted probabilities of third-party voters correctly perceiving the listed party as placing third or worse in the 
district.
“Second-Third Competitiveness” measures competitiveness between second-placed parties and parties placing third or worse by dividing the 
district-level vote percentage for the party listed in each pane of Figure 1 by the district-level vote percentage for the second-placed party in the 
district; higher values represent more competitive races between the listed party and the second-placed party in the district.
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Notes
1. I exclude voters residing in Québec due to the presence of the 
nationalist Bloc Québécois, which complicates the modeling 
strategy because (a) it requires controlling for Bloc ther-
mometer scores that are only available for voters in Québec, 
and (b) the Bloc finished third or worse in only a handful of 
districts in 2006.
2. Though using voting behavior measured in the post-election 
wave introduces potential post-treatment bias, this modeling 
framework allows us to test whether third-party voters were 
significantly less aware the party they voted for was out of the 
running than voters supporting other parties. To demonstrate 
that the results are not distorted substantially by post-treatment 
bias, the supplemental material (see supplemental materials) 
re-runs the analysis using voting intentions measured during 
the pre-election wave. The online appendix provides further 
evidence supporting this conclusion by estimating the impact 
of perceptions of viability on reported voting behavior: these 
results reinforce the conclusions reached here regarding the 
limited impact of perceptions on third-party support.
3. For instance, I hold Liberal thermometer scores to 0.51, NDP 
scores to 0.50, Green scores to 0.49, and Conservative scores 
to 0.48 when analyzing the Liberals.
4. This value is convenient because it reflects the median sec-
ond/third competitiveness score for the Liberals and NDP 
in our sample. I also hold “First-Second Competitiveness” 
to 10—reflecting a competitive race between the top-two 
parties.
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